Smart Mobs Group: chapter 5

“Reputation Marks the Spot where Technology and Cooperation converge...”

Some of the most successful web experiences have been introduced to society have been so because of the means in which the product(s) have been able to recognize the essential elements in which reputation systems can sustain beneficial environments in their group forming network (GFN).

Before I go on with the rest of this blogpost, I gotta warn you. There was a whole boatload of theory in this chapter. I will try to gain as much background as I can find in the spirit of the "hunters and gatherers" premise introduced in the book. Where there are links in this post, you will be taken to another post that collects and fleshes out some of the theories discussed in this chapter.

In the evolution of reputation online, Reingold introduces several examples of where this idea has been recognized. What seems to be his favorite one is Ebay. Most of us know how Ebay’s history having something to do with a woman who wanted to sell her collection of Pez dispensers (sometimes the story is even with Beanie Babies.) Whatever the initial reason, Ebay has ballooned into a billion dollar system of commerce.

Reingold argues that this online system of commerce had been made successful because it meets three properties in which reputation systems much have to sustain themselves.
They are:

1. The identity of buyers and sellers must be long lived such that there is an expectation of future interaction.
2. Feedback about interactions must be available for the inspection of others.
3. People must pay enough attention to reputation ratings to base their decisions on them.

He goes on to say, “Reputation like surveillance, may induce people to police themselves.”

This seemingly basic principle has roots in some not so basic theory. This idea is an extrapolation of two previously stated laws, Reeds Law & Metcalfe’s Law.

Reingold also points out that sociologists and biologists have been testing out these principles in their own studies on human nature.
The most related sociological experiment is known as “The Prisoner’s Dilemma.”
(More on the Prisoner’s Dilemma Here… )
Reingold also introduces game theory which explores this idea of the reputation system, where economists have tested the role in which cooperation and reputation plays between individuals and their ability to self police themselves.

Game theory that is relevant to the idea of the reputation system is described within two games :
1) Ultimatum Game
2) Public Goods Game

The book goes on to stipulate that, “None of the theories and data gathered by biologists, sociologists and economists predicts what populations will do in an environment of ad hoc networks…and online reputation systems, but most of the conditions for a phase change in the scale of cooperation could be met by smart mob infrastructure: mutual monitoring, graduated sanctions, widespread dissemination of both positive and negative reputation information”

Surprisingly there is no mention of Wikipedia in the edition I had read which was published in 2002. The inception of Wikipedia was created in 2001. Wikipedia would be a good example of conversation reputation. However, it cannot apply to the rest of the chapter which focuses on reputation systems primarily focused on commerce. For another example of one that does not have a good example of following through with the reputation system is Craigslist.

Craigslist was also not mentioned in this chapter of reputation and is a good case example based on the reading as to why it is vulnerable to the issues that users of Amazon and Ebay do not experience.
It is missing many of the tenets of what makes a successful reputation system and here are the pages where the group forming system has failed its own community so much that there are forums and other standard warnings to make sure that no one gets taken advantage of.
Scam Warning: http://www.craigslist.org/about/scams.html
Forum to gripe about scams: http://newyork.craigslist.org/forums/?forumID=9

The whole discussion in his chapter on reputation had highlighted one very important thought in the form of a question, which will be the start of our conversation on this chapter.
Rheingold recognizes that the reputation databases of seemingly secure avenues of online commerce never share their databases. Nor do they cross share their information between other systems of commerce, (i.e. Ebay cooperating with Amazon.)

He posed a very serious question with which I hope we can all discuss and continue in this blog:

“Who should own our reputations? Should people be monetizing our reputations or is this a completely acceptable notion?”

3) Game Theory Examples mentioned in Chapter 5: The Evolution of Reputation:

Ultimatum Game

“Based on Emotion where ultimately, the reputation for being a sucker is costly, and the emotional response could be an internal model that serves to regulate cheating.” (p.130)

Online Reference: http://www.altruists.org/ideas/economics/behavioral/

Public Goods Game

Public Goods Game – “Groups in which punishment was allowed resulted in more generous contributions to the common pool, but cooperation deteriorated rapidly in the absence of punishment. Even when there was no possibility of future interaction, many players punished free riders and reported that they did it because they were angry at the cheaters.”(p. 130)

Online Reference: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_goods_game

Prisoner’s Dilemma
Now I can regurgitate what was said in the book like I did with the game's above, but in my hunting and gathering ways, I have found an actual online version of this game. You should definitely check it out. :)

Online Reference: http://serendip.brynmawr.edu/playground/pd.html

Sunday, April 13, 2008

Chapter 5: The Evolution of Reputation

Chapter 5: Game Theory Explained

Chapter 5: Fuzzy Math & A Quick Dive into Theory

Chapter 5: Online Tour Guide of "The Evolution of Reputation"

Which Version of Smart Mobs did you read?

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